In a new Journal of Theoretical Politics article, FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro and Duke University’s political scientist David Siegel advance a new theory of wartime diplomacy to answer these questions. What explains Hanoi’s initial firm position against talks and the sudden policy change in 1968? What are the drivers behind a state’s willingness to talk with the enemy while fighting, what considerations do leaders account for when deciding when and how peace talks can begin, and why do some states reject or ignore overtures to come to the negotiating table? would halt bombing above the 20th parallel. By April 1968, following repeated rebuffs, Hanoi changed its position after President Johnson announced that the U.S. North Vietnam ignored or denied all of these overtures to open talks. During the first three years of the Vietnam War, the United States made over 2000 attempts to open negotiations with the North Vietnamese.
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